Credit Rating Agencies: How Moody’s, S&P and Fitch Failed

By Janet Tavakoli

The Downfall of Credit Rating Agencies

The global financial crisis of 2008 exposed catastrophic failures in our financial system, with credit rating agencies playing a central role in the collapse. Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch—the three major rating agencies—consistently awarded their highest “AAA” ratings to financial products that deserved junk status. This article examines how these rating agencies contributed to the crisis and why fundamental reform remains necessary.

Nearly two decades later, the consequences continue to reverberate, with both Iceland and the United States having lost their pristine AAA ratings from the agencies that failed them during the crisis.

Credit Rating Agencies Failure: The Core Problem

While rating agencies claim they issue “mere opinions,” their impact is far more significant. Their ratings are embedded in the global regulatory and market framework, affecting everything from bank capital requirements to investment fund charters. When these agencies award “AAA” ratings to products that deserve junk status, the consequences are severe and far-reaching.

Moody’s S&P Fitch Problems: Cartel-Like Behavior

The rating agencies operate as a quasi-cartel, with Moody’s and S&P dominating market share. Their fees mysteriously converged over time, suggesting coordinated behavior rather than healthy competition. This cartel-like structure created an environment where competition focused on gaining market share by lowering standards rather than improving rating accuracy.

Structured Finance Ratings: A History of Systemic Failures

The rating agencies’ failures weren’t isolated incidents but rather part of a pattern spanning decades across multiple asset classes and structured finance products.

Credit Card Securitization Failures

All three major rating agencies overrated approximately $2 billion in securitizations backed by charged-off credit card receivables. These investment-grade rated securitizations were downgraded to junk status overnight when problems emerged. Key failures included:

• Lack of proper due diligence on underlying assets.
• Overreliance on issuer-provided data without independent verification.
• Failure to account for selection bias in historical performance data.

CPDO Rating Disasters

Constant Proportion Debt Obligations (CPDOs) were leveraged bets on credit quality that put investors’ principal at significant risk. Despite this, both Moody’s and S&P awarded them “AAA” ratings. When market conditions changed, investors lost approximately 90% of their principal on these supposedly “risk-free” investments.

Both agencies later claimed model errors while defending unsound methodologies. S&P admitted a model error but insisted this “did not result in a ratings change”—ignoring that their entire ratings approach was fundamentally flawed.

Structured Finance Products: The Most Catastrophic Rating Failures

The most devastating rating failures occurred in structured finance products, particularly those backed by mortgage loans.

Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) Misratings

Rating agencies awarded “AAA” ratings to securitizations backed by increasingly risky mortgage portfolios. They failed to account for:

• Declining underwriting standards across the mortgage industry.
• Widespread fraud in loan origination processes.
• The fundamental unsustainability of the housing market bubble.

Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) Failures

CDOs repackaged tranches of already misrated RMBSs, compounding errors through multiple layers of securitization. “AAA” tranches of these deals showed a high probability of significant principal loss from the start.

Credit derivatives allowed the multiplication of risk, as the same bad assets could be referenced multiple times across different deals. The so-called “super senior” tranches—supposedly safer than “AAA”—often resulted in investors losing nearly their entire investment.

Credit derivatives allowed the multiplication of risk, as the same bad assets could be referenced multiple times across different deals. The so-called “super senior” tranches—supposedly safer than “AAA”—often resulted in investors losing nearly their entire investment.

Rating Agency Methodology Problems

The rating agencies’ approach to risk assessment was fundamentally flawed across multiple dimensions.

Arbitrary Risk Scale Definitions

Rating agencies defined their own risk scales without independent verification. They could change methodologies and benchmarks at will, effectively “legislating” changes in global capital requirements without oversight or accountability.

Flawed Correlation Models

Rating agencies focused on correlation models rather than the more critical metrics of probability of default and loss given default. These models were highly unstable, with small input changes causing huge output variations.

Inadequate Due Diligence Requirements

While rating agencies aren’t responsible for performing due diligence themselves, they should have demanded evidence that underwriters had thoroughly examined the underlying assets. Instead, they rated securities without verifying the quality of the collateral.

Structured Finance Ratings Analysis: How Rating Agencies Differ

Rating Agency Approach Variations

Rating agencies use different modeling approaches for structured finance products, creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and inconsistent risk assessment.

Moody’s Approach:

• Claims ratings reflect expected loss, a mathematical concept based on probability of default and loss severity.
• Occasionally changes the expected loss that corresponds to a given rating.
• Uses expected loss approach for payment-in-kind (PIK) tranches.
• Allows PIK-ing in all tranches, including Aaa-rated tranches.

Standard & Poor’s Methodology:

• Emphasizes probability of default over expected loss.
• Occasionally changes in probability of default levels corresponding to ratings.
• Typically PIK-ing only at BBB level or below
• Considers PIK-ing for more than a year under stress test as default for A-rated tranches

Fitch Rating Framework:

• Model historically produced unreliable results due to frequently changing correlation matrix.
• Structurers dubbed it the “Fitch Random Ratings Model” in 2004
• Takes the most reasonable approach to PIK ratings by being specific about rating meaning.
• Distinguishes between timely payment ratings and ultimate payment ratings.

Super Senior Tranche Problems

All three major rating agencies suffer from what can be termed “macular degeneration” regarding super senior tranches. The agencies don’t acknowledge the existence of super senior tranches as a distinct rating category, treating them merely as a “retrofit” that has nothing to do with their rating methodologies.

This creates a fundamental problem: synthetic portfolios can be tranched in different ways, but rating agencies treat “AAA” tranches identically regardless of whether they serve as first-loss protection for super senior tranches.

Multiple Conflicts of Interest in Rating Process

Business Manager Influence

Unlike investment banks, rating agencies had no “Chinese Wall” separating analysts from business managers whose bonuses depended on increasing revenue and market share. While much attention focused on the “issuer-pays” model, the deeper problem was that business managers within rating agencies prioritized market share and revenue over ratings accuracy.

Revolving Door Employment

Banks frequently hired rating agency analysts familiar with rating methodologies, creating incentives for analysts to be accommodating in hopes of future employment. This revolving door undermined the independence necessary for objective credit analysis.

Consulting Services Conflicts

Rating agencies marketed risk consulting and models to the same banks whose securities they rated, creating additional conflicts of interest that compromised their independence.

Regulatory Response: Dodd-Frank Act Limitations

The inadequacy of these reforms is evident in the continued rating volatility and downgrades that followed, including the loss of AAA status for major sovereigns that were victims of the original rating failures.

The Dodd-Frank Act attempted to address rating agency issues but failed to solve fundamental problems:

• Risk Retention Requirements: Easily circumvented through creative structuring.
• Transparency Measures: Insufficient without addressing core methodology problems.
• Conflict of Interest Rules: Failed to address business manager influence over analysts.
• Accountability Measures: No meaningful consequences for systematic rating failures

Solutions for Credit Rating Agency Reform

Rehabilitating the credit rating system requires fundamental reforms across multiple dimensions.

Revoke the NRSRO Designation

The Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) designation should be revoked until rating agencies demonstrate they can produce accurate, reliable ratings. This designation has become meaningless given the systematic failures across asset classes.

Independent Benchmark Standards

A third party (such as an international regulator) should define benchmarks and rating scales. Rating agencies would no longer be free to choose benchmarks or redefine the meaning of ratings at will.

Performance-Based Ranking System

Regulators should rank rating agencies based solely on accuracy and disqualify those that consistently produce inaccurate ratings. Rating accuracy must become the primary—and perhaps only—measurement of success.

Enhanced Due Diligence Requirements

Rating agencies must review evidence of thorough due diligence, particularly in the face of red flags suggesting potential fraud or misrepresentation. They should demand statistical sampling and verification of underlying assets.

Credit Derivatives Ban

Credit derivatives add complexity and opacity that rating agencies have proven incapable of assessing accurately. They should be banned from rated structured finance transactions to reduce systemic risk and improve transparency.

Structured Finance Market Impact

The global market and regulatory framework has been built around credit ratings, even though sophisticated market professionals know better than to rely on them. Until there is an objective, reproducible, and reliable method of providing credit ratings, it will be impossible to rehabilitate the alternative banking system.

Investor Reliance Problems

Many investors believe ratings indicate how secure an investment is as a store of wealth, but this is a fundamental misconception. Ratings provide limited information about:

• Liquidity Risk: All “AA” rated securities are not created equal when it comes to liquidating investments.
• Market Risk: Conventional market risk is not captured by credit ratings.
• Transparency: Disclosure is different from transparency in structured finance.

Fee Structure Issues

Rating agencies’ charges seem to magically converge, partly because fee information is easily leaked and partly because there are only three major agencies chasing structured finance business. This lack of real competition contributes to declining standards.

The Path Forward: Fundamental Reform Requirements

Rather than minor tweaks to a broken system, fundamental reform is needed. Rating agencies must be held to a higher standard, with rating accuracy as the primary measurement of success.

International Coordination

Since ratings are used globally, rating companies should be regulated by an international body rather than piecemeal national regulation that creates regulatory arbitrage opportunities.

Market-Based Solutions

Until objective, reproducible, and reliable rating methods are established, investors should approach credit ratings with extreme caution, particularly for structured products. Independent credit analysis remains essential for prudent risk management.

Long-term Systemic Reform

The rehabilitation of structured finance markets requires addressing not just rating agency problems, but the entire ecosystem of perverse incentives that led to the 2008 financial crisis. This includes reforming underwriter incentives, regulatory oversight, and market transparency requirements.

Credit Rating Agencies Post-2008: Fines, Lawsuits and Continued Rating Failures (2015-2021)

Despite regulatory reforms following the 2008 financial crisis, the major credit rating agencies—Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch—continued to face scrutiny for both their pre-crisis conduct and ongoing rating failures. The pattern of inflated AAA ratings, conflicts of interest, and inadequate risk assessment persisted well into the 2010s and 2020s, demonstrating that fundamental problems remained unresolved.

Credit Rating Agency Lawsuits and Billion-Dollar Settlements

The scale of rating agency failures during the financial crisis eventually led to significant financial penalties, though these came years after the damage was done.

Moody’s $864 Million Mortgage Securities Settlement (2017)

In January 2017, Moody’s agreed to pay nearly $864 million to settle with the U.S. Department of Justice, 21 states, and the District of Columbia over allegations that it contributed to the 2008 financial crisis by inflating ratings on risky mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) from 2004 to 2007. The settlement highlighted how Moody’s assigned AAA ratings to securities that later turned out to be junk, misleading investors about their risk. Connecticut’s lawsuit specifically claimed Moody’s knowingly inflated ratings on toxic mortgage securities due to pressure from investment banks to maintain market share.

S&P $1.5 Billion Structured Products Settlement (2015)

Standard & Poor’s settled with the U.S. Department of Justice for $1.375 billion (totaling $1.5 billion with other settlements) to resolve allegations that it engaged in a scheme to defraud investors by issuing inflated ratings on residential mortgage-backed securities and CDOs before the 2008 crisis. The lawsuit claimed S&P knowingly assigned AAA ratings to structured products backed by subprime mortgages, despite internal evidence suggesting these securities were high-risk. The settlement included admissions that S&P altered its models to gain market share, compromising rating accuracy.

Credit Rating Agency Failures After Financial Crisis Reforms

Rather than learning from past mistakes, rating agencies continued to demonstrate the same fundamental flaws in their approach to structured products and complex financial instruments.

Structured Securities Rating Accuracy Problems (2008-2019)

A 2019 Wall Street Journal analysis of approximately 30,000 ratings of structured securities issued between 2008 and 2019 found that S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch continued to face challenges with rating accuracy. The analysis showed that while post-crisis reforms aimed to improve ratings, the major agencies still issued high ratings to some structured products that later underperformed. The study indicated that increased competition did not necessarily lead to more accurate ratings, as agencies sometimes adjusted criteria to gain market share, echoing pre-2008 behaviors. This raised concerns about the reliability of ratings for post-crisis structured products like asset-backed securities (ABS) and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).

SEC Fines Moody’s and S&P for Rating Violations (2015-2018)

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued multiple fines against both Moody’s and S&P for violations occurring well after the crisis. In 2018, the SEC fined Moody’s for failing to follow internal control procedures and consistently apply credit rating symbols in structured finance ratings. Similarly, in 2015, the SEC issued orders against S&P for violations and fraud in rating structured products, accusing S&P of a “race to the bottom” by lowering standards to compete for market share. These actions targeted post-2008 practices, where both agencies were found to have issued ratings for structured products like RMBS and ABS without adhering to rigorous methodologies.

Examples of Credit Rating Agency Failures: Specific Deals and Downgrades

Moody’s S&P Fitch China Property Bonds Rating Failures (2020-2021)

During the China property market crisis involving companies like Evergrande, Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch faced criticism for maintaining investment-grade ratings for developers’ bonds into 2020 and early 2021, despite mounting evidence of liquidity issues and unsustainable debt levels. Evergrande’s bonds were rated Baa3 (Moody’s) and BBB (S&P and Fitch) as late as 2020, but by late 2021, these ratings were downgraded to junk status as defaults loomed. The rapid downgrades suggested that the agencies underestimated systemic risks in China’s property sector, with structured products tied to these developers seeing sharp value declines.

CMBS Rating Downgrades During COVID-19 Pandemic (2020-2021)

S&P and Moody’s had rated many commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) tranches issued post-2009, particularly in 2017-2019, as AAA or investment-grade, assuming stable cash flows from underlying properties. However, by 2020, these ratings proved overly optimistic as delinquencies spiked during the COVID-19 pandemic. S&P downgraded 63% of its AAA-rated CMBS tranches from 2017-2019 to lower grades, and Moody’s followed suit with similar downgrades. The agencies were criticized for not anticipating the sector’s vulnerability to economic shocks.

Auto Loan ABS Rating Failures: Subprime Lending Returns (2015-2019)

Moody’s and S&P assigned high ratings (AAA) to auto loan asset-backed securities issued in the mid-2010s, particularly those backed by subprime auto loans. By 2018-2019, these securities faced higher-than-expected default rates as subprime borrowers struggled, leading to downgrades. Certain ABS deals rated AAA by Moody’s in 2016 were downgraded to A or lower by 2019 as delinquency rates rose. The agencies were criticized for underestimating risks in the subprime auto market, where lax underwriting standards mirrored pre-2008 mortgage issues.

CLO Rating Downgrades: Leveraged Loan Market Problems (2017-2020)

Fitch and Moody’s assigned AAA ratings to senior tranches of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) issued between 2017 and 2019, despite growing evidence of weakening credit quality in underlying leveraged loans. By 2020, during the COVID-19 market turmoil, Fitch downgraded 25% of its AAA-rated CLO tranches issued in 2018-2019, and Moody’s downgraded 20% of its top-rated tranches, as underlying loan defaults rose. The agencies were criticized for relying on optimistic economic assumptions and failing to account for systemic risks in the leveraged loan market.

Credit Rating Agencies Class Action Lawsuits and Legal Actions

Moody’s $130 Million Pension Fund Settlement: RMBS Misrepresentation (2016)

Moody’s settled for $130 million with a California pension fund over allegations that it misrepresented the risk of structured financial products, including residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), in the pre- and post-crisis periods. The lawsuit claimed Moody’s inflated ratings to maintain business relationships with issuers, affecting investments made by the pension fund in the early 2010s. This case underscored how misstated ratings from the pre-crisis era continued to affect investors post-2008, with pension funds suffering losses due to reliance on inaccurate ratings.

Why Credit Rating Agency Problems Persist: Structural Issues Remain Unresolved

These post-crisis failures revealed that the fundamental issues identified before and during the 2008 crisis remained unresolved:

• Conflicts of Interest: The “issuer-pay” model persisted, leading to allegations of rating inflation to secure business
• Rating Shopping: Issuers continued to seek the highest ratings by shopping among agencies
• Inadequate Stress Testing: Agencies failed to anticipate tail risks like pandemics or sector-specific crises
• Methodological Flaws: Over-reliance on historical data and correlation models without proper granular risk assessment

The consistent pattern of these failures—from pre-crisis CDOs to post-crisis CLOs, from subprime mortgages to Chinese developer bonds—demonstrates that cosmetic regulatory reforms were insufficient to address the rating agencies’ core problems. The agencies’ fundamental approach to risk assessment, their business model incentives, and their role in the global financial system remained unchanged, setting the stage for continued failures in different asset classes and markets.

Long-Term Consequences: Rating Downgrades Continue (2011-2025)

Sovereign Ratings Failures

The structured finance failures extended beyond corporate securities to sovereign ratings, demonstrating the global scope of rating agency incompetence. The rating agencies’ credibility never fully recovered. Post-crisis downgrades of major sovereigns demonstrate the lasting damage to the global financial system.

Iceland’s Rating Disaster

Moody’s maintained Iceland’s “Aaa” rating despite clear signs of excessive leverage and foreign currency borrowing. By October 2008, Iceland’s banking system collapsed, plunging the country into bankruptcy with external debt of approximately $218,000 for each of its 320,000 citizens.

Iceland sovereign rating recovery

In 2025, after a long battle toward economic stability, The rating agencies have assigned long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings as follows:

• Moody’s: A1 with a stable outlook.
• S&P: A+ with a stable outlook.
• Fitch Ratings: A with a stable outlook.

United States’ Lost Her Pre-2008 Financial Crisis “AAA” Rating

After massive bank bailouts, the “AAA” rating of the United States became politically expedient rather than economically justified. The U.S. dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency masked fundamental weaknesses that traditional rating analysis would have identified. But even that advantage could not save the USA from ratings downgrades.

• In 2011, S&P downgraded the United States’ long-term rating to Aa+.
• Fitch downgraded the USA to AA+ in 2023.
• Moody’s downgraded the USA to Aa1 in May 2025.

USA Credit Rating Downgrade 2025

With Moody’s May 2025 rating downgrade, the USA lost her pre-2008 financial crisis AAA rating from the three ratings agencies that played a role in damaging the USA’s economy.

Long-Term Impact: Rating Agency Credibility Never Recovered

The rating agencies’ credibility never fully recovered from their 2008 failures. Their post-crisis downgrades of major sovereigns demonstrate the lasting damage to the global financial system and their continued inability to provide reliable forward-looking credit assessments.

Rating Accuracy Remains Questionable

The systematic downgrades of Iceland (from overrated AAA to current A-range) and the United States (from AAA to AA+/Aa1 across all three agencies) illustrate that the fundamental problems identified in 2008 were never truly resolved. These downgrades occurred years after the obvious problems should have been reflected in ratings.

Conclusion: Learning from Rating Agency Failures

The systematic failures of Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch in rating structured finance products represent one of the most significant regulatory failures in modern financial history. Their inability to accurately assess credit risk, combined with conflicts of interest and methodology problems, contributed directly to the 2008 global financial crisis.

The long-term consequences are evident today: Iceland, which was overrated AAA before its 2008 collapse, now maintains solid A-range ratings after a difficult recovery, while the United States—the supposed safe haven—has been systematically downgraded by all three agencies between 2011 and 2025, losing its AAA status from the very agencies that enabled the crisis.

Recovery requires acknowledging the depth of these failures, implementing comprehensive reforms, and holding rating agencies accountable for their role in enabling widespread financial fraud. Until fundamental changes are made, the global financial system remains vulnerable to similar crises driven by misrated structured finance products.

About the Author

Janet Tavakoli is the president of Tavakoli Structured Finance founded in 2003. She is a globally recognized structured finance expert and derivatives authority who has advised financial regulators, testified as an expert witness in major financial litigation, and authored definitive works on credit derivatives and securitization.

For comprehensive analysis of structured finance products and rating agency reform, consult Tavakoli Structured Finance.

Sources and References

Post-2008 Credit Rating Agency Fines and Failures

Major Settlements and Legal Actions

Butler, Sarah. “Moody’s $864m penalty for ratings in run-up to 2008 financial crisis.” The Guardian, January 14, 2017.

Maverick, J.B. “Inflated Bond Ratings Behind 2008 Crisis May Cause New One.” Investopedia, August 19, 2019.

Hill, Claire A. “Dealing with the conflicts of interest of credit rating agencies.” Capital Markets Law Journal 17, no. 3 (2022): 334-362.

Post-2009 Rating Failures: Specific Cases

Authers, John. “Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch Were Asleep at the China Property Switch.” Bloomberg Opinion, November 1, 2021.

Wigglesworth, Robin. “US commercial property debt faces wave of delinquencies.” Financial Times, June 17, 2020.

Wigglesworth, Robin. “CMBS market faces test as US economy reopens.” Financial Times, March 29, 2021.

Smith, Madison and Eric Platt. “CLO market faces fresh scrutiny as coronavirus hits leveraged loans.” Financial Times, April 15, 2020.

Original Article References

Primary Source Material

Tavakoli, Janet M. Structured Finance and Collateralized Debt Obligations: New Developments in Cash and Synthetic Securitization. 2nd ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008. https://www.amazon.com/dp/1943543313/.

Tavakoli, Janet M. Collateralized Debt Obligations & Structured Finance: New Developments in Cash and Synthetic Securitization. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2003.

Regulatory and Government Sources

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. “Comments on Credit Rating Agency Reform.” Letter from Janet Tavakoli, February 13, 2007.

U.S. Department of Justice. “Justice Department and State Partners Secure Nearly $864 Million Settlement with Moody’s Arising from Conduct in the Lead Up to the 2008 Financial Crisis.” Press release, January 13, 2017.

U.S. Department of Justice. “Justice Department and State Partners Secure $1.375 Billion Settlement with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to the Financial Crisis.” Press release, February 3, 2015.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. “SEC Charges Moody’s With Internal Controls Failures and Ratings Symbols Deficiencies.” Press release, August 28, 2018.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. “SEC Announces Charges Against Standard & Poor’s for Fraudulent Ratings Misconduct.” Press release, January 21, 2015.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. “SEC Charges Six Credit Rating Agencies with Significant Recordkeeping Failures.” Press release, September 3, 2024.

U.S. Congress. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. “The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Financial Crisis.” Subprime probe including Clayton Holdings Inc. due diligence reports, 2008-2009.

Financial Industry Analysis

Tavakoli, Janet M. “Rating the Rating Agencies.” Risk Professional (formerly GARP Risk Review), January 2005.

The Joint Forum, Bank for International Settlements. “Report on Asset Securitisation Incentives.” Basel: Bank for International Settlements, July 2011.

News Media Coverage

Sloan, Allan and Doris Burke. “Junk mortgages under the microscope.” Fortune, October 16, 2008.

Multiple authors. “AIG, Goldman Sachs, and structured products coverage.” The Wall Street Journal, 2007-2008.

Tett, Gillian and Francesco Guerrera. “Rating agencies face criticism over corporate failures.” Financial Times, December 2003.

Legal Cases and Court Documents

United States of America v. William R. Bartmann. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, Criminal Case No. 99-CR-00069-TCK, 1999-2003.

Springfield Finance Control Board v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Settlement regarding CDO investments, 2008.

California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Moody’s Corporation. Settlement agreement for $130 million, 2016.

Chase Securities v. Commercial Financial Services. Private settlement (amount undisclosed), 1999.

Academic and Professional Sources

Cifuentes, Arturo and Jose Miguel Cruz. “White Paper on Rating Agency Reform.” Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Chile, May 2010.

Additional Data Sources

Bloomberg Terminal. “Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, and FDIC bailout pledges estimate.” March 21, 2009.

Trepp LLC. “CMBS delinquency data during COVID-19 pandemic.” Commercial mortgage data service, 2020-2021.

S&P Global Market Intelligence. “Subprime auto loan and leveraged loan default rate data.” 2015-2020.

Finsight.com. “Structured securities ratings compilation, 2008-2019.” Referenced in Wall Street Journal analysis, 2019.

Related Tavakoli Structured Finance Resources

Tavakoli Structured Finance. “Credit Rating Agencies: How to Restore Credibility Credit Rating Agencies.” Previously published as: “Tavakoli Structured Finance Revokes the Credit Rating Agencies’ NRSRO Designation: Issues and Solutions for Restoring Credibility to the Credit Ragint Agencies and Rehabilitating the Alternative Banking Systen,” July 26, 2011 Accessed June 2025.

Tavakoli Structured Finance. “Collateralized Debt Obligations.” Accessed June 2025. https://www.tavakolistructuredfinance.com/cdo/.

Tavakoli Structured Finance. “Collateralized Fund Obligations (CFOs): Complete Guide.” Accessed June 2025.

Tavakoli Structured Finance. “Credit Derivatives and Credit Default Swaps.” Accessed June 2025.

Tavakoli Structured Finance. “Special Purpose Entities: Guide to SPEs in Finance.” Accessed June 2025.

Tavakoli Structured Finance. “Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations: Risk, Valuation, and Market Practice.”

Tavakoli Structured Finance. “Monoline Ratings.” Accessed June 2025.

Tavakoli Structured Finance. “Subprime CDO Warning.” Accessed June 2025.

Tavakoli Structured Finance. “Merrill CDO Fraud.” Accessed June 2025.

Tavakoli Structured Finance. “Goldman AIG Bailout.” Accessed June 2025.

Tavakoli Structured Finance. “Total Return Swaps (TRS): Benefits, Risks and Applications.” Accessed June 2025.