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Speaking
the Right Language:
CDOs Mezzanine and Equity
ISR
International Securitisation Report
Issue 88, May 2004
Rachael
Horsewood reports.
The legal dispute
surrounding the two Beacon Hill collateralized bond obligations
(CBOs) poses a hard lesson for structured finance
investors. The CBO investors have been trying to get Beacon Hill
Asset Management to step down as manager since last year – after
the US Securities and exchange Commission pressurized the firm
to come clean on losses it was hiding on the hedge funds it managed.
But could these investors have looked over the CBO documentation
more carefully and demanded more flexibility in replacing the
manager? Janet Tavakoli, a structured financing
consultant, says yes.
“Just look at how long it is taking the Enron and WorldCom
cases to move forward. So much time is spent on gathering evidence
that by the time and investor wants to replace its manager your
CDO is already suffering from reputation risk. No one will want
to touch your tranches, and if you try to sell them people will
say ‘no thanks, I know who the manager is,” she explains.
It is even more difficult
to gauge how well the actual operational risk management heads,
senior executives or not, understand documentation
issues related to manager agreements, derivatives and other structured
product contracts. Nonetheless, it is clear that more investors
are spending money on independent consultants in the structured
finance field to help the firm make decisions concerning them. “Often
lawyers are not aware of the potential problems,” Tavakoli
asserts.
This is not to say that the operational risk management head
needs to be sitting in on negotiations. Even though AXA Investment
Management has an operational risk management department, its
front line must be sharply aware of International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) master agreements. US Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP), French GAAP and IAS 39 when it considers new
deals.
“Whether we are managing or investing in a CDO we have
to really understand the accounting treatment of everything about
it. This includes everything from the consolidation to the mark-to-market
of the contracts,” says Deborah Shire, AXA’s head
of structuring securitization and structured credit in the firm’s
structured and alternative investment management division in
Paris.
Mezzanine Misconceptions
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| The equity piece of a mezzanine tranche can be a tricky
one when it comes to collateralized debt obligations (CDO)
documentation. Arrangers often tell investors that the equity
does not exist when a single tranche deal is done and the
mezzanine is sold off. This is another reason why it is important
for investors to comb through documentation carefully before
entering into a deal. And because the equity is synthetic,
managers often cannot even find it, so it is something they
need to watch as well.
“People do not like to admit that they are long
the equity on the arranger’s books, so banks tell
investors that the equity does not exist if you short the
mezzanine trance of a CDO,” says Janet Tavakoli,
a Chicago-based structured financing consultant.
By
law, the arranger is supposed to report this, but some
sources tell ISR that the majority of
banks involved
in
this market do not account for it in their call reports
in the US. The head of structuring at a North American
bank recently said: “If my manager really knew what
I was doing he would fire me”.
Tavakoli
says that if a bank tranches up a portfolio of cash bonds
and sells the mezzanine
tranche, it is
important
to ask where each piece is going before buying anything. “If
you do not sell the triple-A or the equity and just sell
the middle, then it is pretty obvious that you are holding
the equity,” she explains.
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She adds: “It
is not one single job. Operational risk addresses a load of
different issues that are managed throughout the entire organization.
As the products become more complex we need more resources
to analyse them, but there is not one umbrella for all of it.
The risk management, audit and legal issues are addressed throughout
the investment process.”
Few players
are as up to speed as players like AXA, who are both investor
and collateral manager. However, even the more
sophisticated firms miss overlaps and gaps of the credit-related
operational risks. “A lot of investors just do not have
the guts to get things rewritten in the management agreement.
For example, when you are getting married you do not want to
write up some clause that is going to end up in divorce,” Tavakoli says.
The problem,
she adds, is that so many players feel that ISDA is the language.
If it is over-the-counter, then it is private
and can be negotiated, she explains. “Arrangers try to
make out that the language they use is ISDA standard even though
it is not always the case. Most investors are completely unaware
of the disadvantages so it is easy for arrangers to hide behind
the ISDA mantle and get naïve investors to accept whatever
language they want.”
According to consultants,
investors often ask about the fee structures and what they
mean. But is not easy breaking it down.
Tavakoli says investors have to watch out
for the “documentation
arbitrage” that banks play.
She says
banks add in fees at different times even after they have
already taken
out extra basis points. “The bank shows
the investor an all-in average spread on the portfolio that is
lower than the actual average bid side spread of the portfolio.
That way then can capture extra basis points without the investor
knowing it.”
Single
tranche deals have been particularly lucrative for banks this
past year,
so it is often difficult to get information about
the fee structures for them. “The bank does not want an
investor that is going to invest in a huge mezzanine tranche
to know that they are actually driving the deal,” she adds.
END OF EXCERPT
Janet Tavakoli is the president of Tavakoli
Structured Finance, a Chicago-based firm that provides consulting to financial
institutions and institutional investors. Ms. Tavakoli has more than 20 years
of experience in senior investment banking positions, trading, structuring and
marketing structured financial products. She is a former adjunct professor of
derivatives at the University of Chicago's Graduate School of Business. She is
the author of: Credit
Derivatives & Synthetic Structures (John Wiley & Sons, 1998,
2001), Structured
Finance & Collateralized Debt Obligations (John Wiley & Sons,
2008).
Janet Tavakoli's
book on the global financial meltdown is Dear
Mr. Buffett: What An Investor Learns 1,269 Miles From Wall
Street (Wiley 2009).
Clients of Tavakoli Structured Finance have the benefit of proprietary consultation,
which is not available in any other paid or public forum. Clients also commission
proprietary research and analysis.
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