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Secret
AIG Document Shows Goldman Sachs Minted Most Toxic CDOs
Bloomberg News – February
23, 2010
By Richard Teitelbaum
Janet Tavakoli, founder of Tavakoli Structured
Finance Inc., a Chicago-based consulting
firm, says the New York Fed’s secrecy
has helped hide who’s responsible
for the worst of the disaster. “The
suppression of the details in the list
of counterparties was part of the coverup,” she
says.
E-mails between Fed and AIG officials that Issa released in
January show that the efforts to keep Schedule A under wraps
came from the New York Fed. Revelation of the messages contributed
to the heated atmosphere at the House hearing.
At the Jan. 27 hearing, the New York Fed was still arguing that
the contents of Schedule A shouldn’t be fully disclosed.
Thomas Baxter, the New York Fed’s general counsel, testified
that divulging the names of the CDOs could erode their value: “We
will be hurt because traders in the market will know what we’re
holding.”
Tavakoli calls that wrong. With many CDOs, providing more information
to the market will give the manager a greater chance of fetching
a realistic price, she says.
Bad to Worse
Jack Gutt, a spokesman for the New York Fed, declined
to comment, as did AIG’s Mark Herr.
Tavakoli also says that
the poor performance of the underlying securities (which are actually
specific slices or tranches of
CDOs) shows they were toxic in the first place and were probably
replenished with bundles of mortgages that were particularly
troubled. Managers who oversee CDOs after they are created have
discretion in choosing the mortgage bonds used to replenish them.
“
The original CDO deals were bad enough,” Tavakoli
says. “For some that allow reinvesting or substitution,
any reasonable professional would ask why these assets were being
traded into the portfolio. The Schedule A shows that we should
be investigating these deals.”
[JT Note: Davis Square IV,
different from the deal mentioned below, is an example of the latter.]
Among
the CDOs on Schedule A with notional values of more than $1 billion,
the worst performer was a tranche identified as Davis
Square Funding Ltd.’s DVSQ 2006-6A CP. It was held by Societe
Generale, underwritten by Goldman Sachs and managed by TCW Group
Inc., a Los Angeles-based unit of SocGen, according to Bloomberg
data. It lost 77.7 percent of its value -- though it isn’t
in default and continues to pay.
End of Excerpt
JT Note: Current payment is one
issue, but it is not a reliable indicator of the CDOs health.
When AIG was first bailed out on
September 2008, would an analysis of Davis Square VI have shown
that investors were unlikely to receive a substantial portion
of their principal back at maturity? The market price of this
deal would have already been severely depressed on September
2008, and AIG had already paid out around $13 billion to Goldman
Sachs and SocGen, payments which would have been questioned if
AIG had not been rescued. A reasonable negotiator might have
recharacterized these payments, and all subsequent payments,
as a loan.
Janet
Tavakoli is the president of Tavakoli
Structured Finance, a Chicago-based firm
that provides consulting to financial institutions
and institutional investors. Ms. Tavakoli
has more than 20 years
of experience in senior investment banking
positions, trading, structuring and marketing
structured financial products. She
is a former adjunct professor of derivatives
at the University of Chicago's Graduate
School of Business. She is the author of: Credit
Derivatives & Synthetic Structures (John
Wiley & Sons,
1998, 2001), Structured
Finance & Collateralized
Debt Obligations (John
Wiley & Sons, 2008).
Janet
Tavakoli's book on the global financial meltdown is Dear
Mr. Buffett: What An Investor
Learns 1,269 Miles From
Wall Street (Wiley 2009)
Clients
of Tavakoli Structured Finance
have the benefit of proprietary consultation, which is
not available in any other paid or public forum. Clients
also commission proprietary research and analysis.
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