In July 2009, New York Attorney General
Andrew Cuomo reported that,
among other things, the compensation structures
at most banks were “a major impetus
for the subprime fiasco.”*
Shareholders
fed up with the fact that key contributors to the global credit
crisis
plan to pay billions of dollars worth of
cash and stock in bonuses to employees might consider following
Goldman’s suit. Goldman Sachs’s shareholders brought separate
actions against the Board of Directors for alleged breach
of fiduciary duties in approving billions of dollars in bonuses.
Bank of America and its acquisitions, Countrywide and Merrill
Lynch, were neck-deep in the subprime crisis. In July 2008, Bank
of America acquired Countrywide, which made $97 billion in subprime
or high interest loans during the peak years of 2005 through
2007.** On October 6, 2008 (three days after TARP was approved),
Bank of America agreed to settle a multi-state predatory lending
lawsuit against Countrywide for $8.7 billion. Bank of America
received its first $25 billion TARP injection around three weeks
later.
Bank
of America proposes to pay billions of dollars worth of cash
and
stock bonuses
to its Merrill Lynch employees. Merrill
Lynch claims that the fact that it lost tens of billions of dollars
on so-called super senior ‘investments” during the
crisis is proof it innocently sold risky investments to others.
Don’t believe it. Here’s what happened. Merrill was
involved with a lot of subprime lending and packaging and knew
or should have known exactly what it was doing. What is more,
Merrill had other pockets of risk unrelated to subprime.
For
example, in December 2006, Ownit, a California-based mortgage
lender
partly owned
by Merrill, declared bankruptcy. Its CEO,
William Dallas, stated he was paid
more to originate no-income-verification loans than for loans
with full documentation. Michael Blum, then Merrill
Lynch's head of global asset-backed finance, sat on Ownit’s
board. (Blum left Merrill in mid 2008 after the securitization
was cut back.) When Ownit declared bankruptcy—instead
of demanding a fraud audit—Blum faxed in his resignation.
After
the bankruptcy, Merrill continued packaging Ownit’s
loans. Following a multi-year pattern, Merrill disguised the
risk. Merrill packaged Ownit’s risky loans in 2007, and failed
to disclose that it was Ownit’s largest creditor.
Within a year, the so-called “AAA” rated tranche
was downgraded to a junk rating of B, meaning you are likely
to lose your shirt. (A mutual fund was stuck with it.) This meant
that “investment grade” tranches below the “AAA” were
worthless or nearly worthless, because those investors agreed
to take losses before the “AAA” investors.
Losses were not simply due to fickle market prices. There was
permanent value destruction.
Merrill
Lynch further disguised risk by repackaging phony “investment
grade” tranches into new investments called CDOs and CDO-squared.
Credit derivatives amplified the problem, because one could sell
value-destroying investments more than once. This was only obvious
to professionals, because some mortgages took a couple of years
for payments to reset. By 2007, things were so bad that many
loans were total shams and began defaulting almost immediately.
This is the classic end of a Ponzi scheme.
Merrill Lynch did not sell tens of billions of uninsured so-called
super-safe “super senior,” CDOs, because if it
had, in-the-know market players would have discounted them.***
Merrill’s employees wanted to continue to earn high bonuses,
so they did not sell them, they did not record losses, and
they temporarily got away with this fiction. Merrill’s
accountants—like all of Wall Street’s accounting
firms—failed in their jobs.
At
the beginning of 2007, the problem was obvious to many alert
non-professionals,
but the SEC still let Merrill (and other
Wall Street firms) get away with it. That year, Merrill Lynch
issued 30 CDOs amounting to $32 billion. Within a year, every
single CDO had its “AAA” tranches downgraded to junk
by one or more rating agencies. (Click here for
my June 2008 commentary. The third page shows each 2007 CDO,
the CDO “manager” involved,
and the CDOs' status at the time.)
By
the second quarter of 2007, Merrill’s executives still
told shareholders things were rosy. Yet Bear Stearns’s
hedge fund creditors heavily discounted similar investments and
put low prices on many of them. Credit derivatives benchmarks
began a death spiral. Merrill Lynch failed to take billions of
dollars of losses for the second quarter of 2007, despite publicly
available information that belied its accounting reports.
Bank
of America struck a deal to acquire Merrill Lynch in September
2008. In January 2009, one month after the shareholder vote on
the merger, BofA revealed that Merrill reported more than $15
billion in
losses
for the
fourth
quarter
of 2008. Even then BofA did not come clean about the exact timing
of the losses. BofA claimed the losses occurred in December.
I publicly
refuted the claim and said most of the losses had probably occurred
in November due to trading activities unrelated to subprime or
CDOs (Click here for
more).
In
this January 23, 2009 CNBC video, I refuted BofA’s
timing claim at 04:28:
Bank of America kept
shareholders in the dark and took another
$20 billion in TARP money. The Slumbering Esquires Club (SEC)
may just now file a
new complaint to add the charge that Merrill
failed to disclose the enormous material losses before the December
2008 shareholder vote.
Bank of America continues to receive massive subsidies from
the U.S. taxpayer without which its level of earnings would not
be possible. BofA took $45 billion in TARP money (since repaid),
has guarantees of $118 billion against bad assets, and continues
to receive massive amounts of taxpayer financing subsidies in
various forms.
Why
should Bank of America—or any other firm involved
with the debacle—hand out billions of dollars worth of
cash and stock to employees while pretending its business model
and incentives aren't fatally flawed?
**********
* Bank of America, Merrill Lynch (now part of Bank of America),
Washington Mutual (now part of JPMorgan Chase), Wells Fargo,
General Electric, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Bear Stearns (now
part of JPMorgan Chase), AIG, and Wachovia (now part of Wells
Fargo) were participants or are now current owners of the top
20 subprime (or high interest loan) lenders during the period
of the worst abuses from 2005 through 2007. In addition, these
financial institutions, along with Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley,
contributed funding through credit lines or sales without which
the lending would not have been possible. (Click here for a list
of subprime mortgage backed securities underwriters.)
** Countrywide was renamed Bank of America Home Loans in February
2009. Separately, BofA bought Merrill Lynch, which bought First
Franklin from Nat City in September 2006. First Franklin was
one of the top four subprime lenders with more than $68 billion
in loans from 2005 to the end of 2007. The operation was closed
in March 2008.
*** Merrill
Lynch could not find enough demand from bond insurers to disguise
its risk. AIG stopped insuring Merrill’s CDOs
before the end of 2006. Merrill insured other CDOs with other
bond insurers: ACA (now bankrupt) and municipal bond insurer
MBIA, which was since downgraded from AAA to junk.
Janet
Tavakoli is the president of Tavakoli
Structured Finance, a Chicago-based firm
that provides consulting to financial institutions
and institutional investors. Ms. Tavakoli
has more than 20 years
of experience in senior investment banking
positions, trading, structuring and marketing
structured financial products. She
is a former adjunct professor of derivatives
at the University of Chicago's Graduate
School of Business. She is the author of: Credit
Derivatives & Synthetic Structures (John
Wiley & Sons,
1998, 2001), Structured
Finance & Collateralized Debt Obligations (John
Wiley & Sons, 2008).
Janet
Tavakoli's book on the global financial meltdown is Dear
Mr. Buffett: What An Investor
Learns 1,269 Miles From
Wall Street (Wiley 2009) Clients
of Tavakoli Structured Finance
have the benefit of proprietary consultation, which is
not available in any other paid or public forum. Clients
also commission proprietary research and analysis. TSF
makes some information available to the general public.Please
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